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Replicability-Ranking of 100 Social Psychology Departments

Please see the new post on rankings of psychology departments that is based on all areas of psychology and covers the years from 2010 to 2015 with separate information for the years 2012-2015.

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Old post on rankings of social psychology research at 100 Psychology Departments

This post provides the first analysis of replicability for individual departments. The table focuses on social psychology and the results cannot be generalized to other research areas in the same department. An explanation of the rational and methodology of replicability rankings follows in the text below the table.

Department 2010-2014
Macquarie University 91
New Mexico State University 82
The Australian National University 81
University of Western Australia 74
Maastricht University 70
Erasmus University Rotterdam 70
Boston University 69
KU Leuven 67
Brown University 67
University of Western Ontario 67
Carnegie Mellon 67
Ghent University 66
University of Tokyo 64
University of Zurich 64
Purdue University 64
University College London 63
Peking University 63
Tilburg University 63
University of California, Irvine 63
University of Birmingham 62
University of Leeds 62
Victoria University of Wellington 62
University of Kent 62
Princeton 61
University of Queensland 61
Pennsylvania State University 61
Cornell University 59
University of California at Los Angeles 59
University of Pennsylvania 59
University of New South Wales (UNSW) 59
Ohio State University 58
National University of Singapore 58
Vanderbilt University 58
Humboldt Universit„ät Berlin 58
Radboud University 58
University of Oregon 58
Harvard University 56
University of California, San Diego 56
University of Washington 56
Stanford University 55
Dartmouth College 55
SUNY Albany 55
University of Amsterdam 54
University of Texas, Austin 54
University of Hong Kong 54
Chinese University of Hong Kong 54
Simone Fraser University 54
Ruprecht-Karls-Universitaet Heidelberg 53
University of Florida 53
Yale University 52
University of California, Berkeley 52
University of Wisconsin 52
University of Minnesota 52
Indiana University 52
University of Maryland 52
University of Toronto 51
Northwestern University 51
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 51
Nanyang Technological University 51
University of Konstanz 51
Oxford University 50
York University 50
Freie Universit„ät Berlin 50
University of Virginia 50
University of Melbourne 49
Leiden University 49
University of Colorado, Boulder 49
Univeritä„t Würzburg 49
New York University 48
McGill University 48
University of Kansas 48
University of Exeter 47
Cardiff University 46
University of California, Davis 46
University of Groningen 46
University of Michigan 45
University of Kentucky 44
Columbia University 44
University of Chicago 44
Michigan State University 44
University of British Columbia 43
Arizona State University 43
University of Southern California 41
Utrecht University 41
University of Iowa 41
Northeastern University 41
University of Waterloo 40
University of Sydney 40
University of Bristol 40
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 40
University of California, Santa Barbara 40
University of Arizona 40
Cambridge University 38
SUNY Buffalo 38
Duke University 37
Florida State University 37
Washington University, St. Louis 37
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universit„ät München 36
University of Missouri 34
London School of Economics 33

Replicability scores of 50% and less are considered inadequate (grade F). The reason is that less than 50% of the published results are expected to produce a significant result in a replication study, and with less than 50% successful replications, the most rational approach is to treat all results as false because it is unclear which results would replicate and which results would not replicate.

RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY

University rankings have become increasingly important in science. Top ranking universities use these rankings to advertise their status. The availability of a single number of quality and distinction creates pressures on scientists to meet criteria that are being used for these rankings. One key criterion is the number of scientific articles that are being published in top ranking scientific journals under the assumption that these impact factors of scientific journals track the quality of scientific research. However, top ranking journals place a heavy premium on novelty without ensuring that novel findings are actually true discoveries. Many of these high-profile discoveries fail to replicate in actual replication studies. The reason for the high rate of replication failures is that scientists are rewarded for successful studies, while there is no incentive to publish failures. The problem is that many of these successful studies are obtained with the help of luck or questionable research methods. For example, scientists do not report studies that fail to support their theories. The problem of bias in published results has been known for a long time (Sterling, 1959). However, few researchers were aware of the extent of the problem.   New evidence suggests that more than half of published results provide false or extremely biased evidence. When more than half of published results are not credible, a science loses its credibility because it is not clear which results can be trusted and which results provide false information.

The credibility and replicability of published findings varies across scientific disciplines (Fanelli, 2010). More credible sciences are more willing to conduct replication studies and to revise original evidence. Thus, it is inappropriate to make generalized claims about the credibility of science. Even within a scientific discipline credibility and replicability can vary across sub-disciplines. For example, results from cognitive psychology are more replicable than results from social psychology. The replicability of social psychological findings is extremely low. Despite an increase in sample size, which makes it easier to obtain a significant result in a replication study, only 5 out of 38 replication studies produced a significant result. If the replication studies had used the same sample sizes as the original studies, only 3 out of 38 results would have replicated, that is, produced a significant result in the replication study. Thus, most published results in social psychology are not trustworthy.

There have been mixed reactions by social psychologists to the replication crisis in social psychology. On the one hand, prominent leaders of the field have defended the status quo with the following arguments.

1 – The experiments who conducted the replication studies are incompetent (Bargh, Schnall, Gilbert).

2 – A mysterious force makes effects disappear over time (Schooler).

3 – A statistical artifact (regression to the mean) will always make it harder to find significant results in a replication study (Fiedler).

4 – It is impossible to repeat social psychological studies exactly and a replication study is likely to produce different results than an original study (the hidden moderator) (Schwarz, Strack).

These arguments can be easily dismissed because they do not explain why cognitive psychologists and other scientific disciplines have more successful replications and more failed results.   The real reason for the low replicability of social psychology is that social psychologists conduct many, relatively cheap studies that often fail to produce the expected results. They then conduct exploratory data analyses to find unexpected patterns in the data or they simply discard the study and publish only studies that support a theory that is consistent with the data (Bem). This hazardous approach to science can produce false positive results. For example, it allowed Bem (2011) to publish 9 significant results that seemed to show that humans can foresee unpredictable outcomes in the future. Some prominent social psychologists defend this approach to science.

“We did run multiple studies, some of which did not work, and some of which worked better than others. You may think that not reporting the less successful studies is wrong, but that is how the field works.” (Roy Baumeister,)

The lack of rigorous scientific standards also allowed Diederik Stapel, a prominent social psychologist to fabricate data, which led to over 50 retractions of scientific articles. The commission that investigated Stapel came to the conclusion that he was only able to publish so many fake articles because social psychology is a “sloppy science,” where cute findings and sexy stories count more than empirical facts.

Social psychology faces a crisis of confidence. While social psychology tried hard to convince the general public that it is a real science, it actually failed to follow standard norms of science to ensure that social psychological theories are based on objective replicable findings. Social psychology therefore needs to reform its practices if it wants to be taken serious as a scientific field that can provide valuable insights into important question about human nature and human behavior.

There are many social psychologists who want to improve scientific standards. For example, the head of the OSF-reproducibility project, Brian Nosek, is a trained social psychologist. Mickey Inzlicht published a courageous self-analysis that revealed problems in some of his most highly cited articles and changed the way his lab is conducting studies to improve social psychology. Incoming editors of social psychology journals are implementing policies to increase the credibility of results published in their journals (Simine Vazire; Roger Giner-Sorolla). One problem for social psychologists willing to improve their science is that the current incentive structure does not reward replicability. The reason is that it is possible to count number of articles and number of citations, but it seems difficult to quantify replicability and scientific integrity.

To address this problem, Jerry Brunner and I developed a quantitative measure of replicability. The replicability-score uses published statistical results (p-values) and transforms them into absolute z-scores. The distribution of z-scores provides information about the statistical power of a study given the sample size, design, and observed effect size. Most important, the method takes publication bias into account and can estimate the true typical power of published results. It also reveals the presence of a file-drawer of unpublished failed studies, if the published studies contain more significant results than the actual power of studies allows. The method is illustrated in the following figure that is based on t- and F-tests published in the most important journals that publish social psychology research.

PHP-Curve Social Journals

The green curve in the figure illustrates the distribution of z-scores that would be expected if a set of studies had 53% power. That is, random sampling error will sometimes inflate the observed effect size and sometimes deflate the observed effect size in a sample relative to the population effect size. With 54% power, there would be 46% (1 – .54 = .46) non-significant results because the study had insufficient power to demonstrate an effect that actually exists. The graph shows that the green curve fails to describe the distribution of observed z-scores. On the one hand, there are more extremely high z-scores. This reveals that the set of studies is heterogeneous. Some studies had more than 54% power and others had less than 54% power. On the other hand, there are fewer non-significant results than the green curve predicts. This discrepancy reveals that non-significant results are omitted from the published reports.

Given the heterogeneity of true power, the red curve is more appropriate. It provides the best fit to the observed z-scores that are significant (z-scores > 2). It does not model the z-scores below 2 because non-significant z-scores are not reported.   The red-curve gives a lower estimate of power and shows a much larger file-drawer.

I limit the power analysis to z-scores in the range from 2 to 4. The reason is that z-scores greater than 4 imply very high power (> 99%). In fact, many of these results tend to replicate well. However, many theoretically important findings are published with z-scores less than 4 as evidence. These z-scores do not replicate well. If social psychology wants to improve its replicability, social psychologists need to conduct fewer studies with more statistical power that yield stronger evidence and they need to publish all studies to reduce the file-drawer.

To provide an incentive to increase the scientific standards in social psychology, I computed the replicability-score (homogeneous model for z-scores between 2 and 4) for different journals. Journal editors can use the replicability rankings to demonstrate that their journal publishes replicable results. Here I report the first rankings of social psychology departments.   To rank departments, I searched the database of articles published in social psychology journals for the affiliation of articles’ authors. The rankings are based on the z-scores of these articles published in the years 2010 to 2014. I also conducted an analysis for the year 2015. However, the replicability scores were uncorrelated with those in 2010-2014 (r = .01). This means that the 2015 results are unreliable because the analysis is based on too few observations. As a result, the replicability rankings of social psychology departments cannot reveal recent changes in scientific practices. Nevertheless, they provide a first benchmark to track replicability of psychology departments. This benchmark can be used by departments to monitor improvements in scientific practices and can serve as an incentive for departments to create policies and reward structures that reward scientific integrity over quantitative indicators of publication output and popularity. Replicabilty is only one aspect of high-quality research, but it is a necessary one. Without sound empirical evidence that supports a theoretical claim, discoveries are not real discoveries.

Examining the Replicability of 66,212 Published Results in Social Psychology: A Post-Hoc-Power Analysis Informed by the Actual Success Rate in the OSF-Reproducibilty Project

The OSF-Reproducibility-Project examined the replicability of 99 statistical results published in three psychology journals. The journals covered mostly research in cognitive psychology and social psychology. An article in Science, reported that only 35% of the results were successfully replicated (i.e., produced a statistically significant result in the replication study).

I have conducted more detailed analyses of replication studies in social psychology and cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology had a notably higher success rate (50%, 19 out of 38) than social psychology (8%, 3 out of 38). The main reason for this discrepancy is that social psychologists and cognitive psychologists use different designs. Whereas cognitive psychologists typically use within-subject designs with many repeated measurements of the same individual, social psychologists typically assign participants to different groups and compare behavior on a single measure. This so-called between-subject design makes it difficult to detect small experimental effects because it does not control the influence of other factors that influence participants’ behavior (e.g., personality dispositions, mood, etc.). To detect small effects in these noisy data, between-subject designs require large sample sizes.

It has been known for a long time that sample sizes in between-subject designs in psychology are too small to have a reasonable chance to detect an effect (less than 50% chance to find an effect that is actually there) (Cohen, 1962; Schimmack, 2012; Sedlmeier & Giegerenzer, 1989). As a result, many studies fail to find statistically significant results, but these studies are not submitted for publication. Thus, only studies that achieved statistical significance with the help of chance (the difference between two groups is inflated by uncontrolled factors such as personality) are reported in journals. The selective reporting of lucky results creates a bias in the published literature that gives a false impression of the replicability of published results. The OSF-results for social psychology make it possible to estimate the consequences of publication bias on the replicability of results published in social psychology journals.

A naïve estimate of the replicability of studies would rely on the actual success rate in journals. If journals would publish significant and non-significant results, this would be a reasonable approach. However, journals tend to publish exclusively significant results. As a result, the success rate in journals (over 90% significant results; Sterling, 1959; Sterling et al., 1995) gives a drastically inflated estimate of replicability.

A somewhat better estimate of replicability can be obtained by computing post-hoc power based on the observed effect sizes and sample sizes of published studies. Statistical power is the long-run probability that a series of exact replication studies with the same sample size would produce significant results. Cohen (1962) estimated that the typical power of psychological studies is about 60%. Thus, even for 100 studies that all reported significant results, only 60 are expected to produce a significant result again in the replication attempt.

The problem with Cohen’s (1962) estimate of replicability is that post-hoc-power analysis uses the reported effect sizes as an estimate of the effect size in the population. However, due to the selection bias in journals, the reported effect sizes and power estimates are inflated. In collaboration with Jerry Brunner, I have developed an improved method to estimate typical power of reported results that corrects for the inflation in reported effect sizes. I applied this method to results from 38 social psychology articles included in the OSF-reproducibility project and obtained a replicability estimate of 35%.

The OSF-reproducbility project provides another opportunity to estimate the replicability of results in social psychology. The OSF-project selected a representative set of studies from two journals and tried to reproduce the same experimental conditions as closely as possible. This should produce unbiased results and the success rate provides an estimate of replicability. The advantage of this method is that it does not rely on statistical assumptions. The disadvantage is that the success rate depends on the ability to exactly recreate the conditions of the original studies. Any differences between studies (e.g., recruiting participants from different populations) can change the success rate. The OSF replication studies also often changed the sample size of the replication study, which will also change the success rate. If sample sizes in a replication study are larger, power increases and the success rate no longer can be used as an estimate of the typical replicability of social psychology. To address this problem, it is possible to apply a statistical adjustment and use the success rate that would have occurred with the original sample sizes. I found that 5 out of 38 (13%) produced significant results and after correcting for the increase in sample size, replicability was only 8% (3 out of 38).

One important question is how how representative the 38 results from the OSF-project are for social psychology in general. Unfortunately, it is practically impossible and too expensive to conduct a large number of exact replication studies. In comparison, it is relatively easy to apply post-hoc power analysis to a large number of statistical results reported in social psychology. Thus, I examined the representativeness of the OSF-reproducibility results by comparing the results of my post-hoc power analysis based on the 38 results in the OSF to a post-hoc-power analysis of a much larger number of results reported in major social psychology journals .

I downloaded articles from 12 social psychology journals, which are the primary outlets for publishing experimental social psychology research: Basic and Applied Social Psychology, British Journal of Social Psychology, European Journal of Social Psychology, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Attitudes and Social Cognition, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology: Interpersonal Relationships and Group Processes, Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, Personal Relationships, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, Social Cognition, Social Psychology and Personality Science, Social Psychology.

I converted pdf files into text files and searched for all reports of t-tests or F-tests and converted the reported test-statistic into exact two-tailed p-values. The two-tailed p-values were then converted into z-scores by finding the z-score corresponding to the probability of 1-p/2, with p equal the two-tailed p-value. The total number of z-scores included in the analysis is 134,929.

I limited my estimate of power to z-scores in the range between 2 and 4. Z-scores below 2 are not statistically significant (z = 1.96, p = .05). Sometimes these results are reported as marginal evidence for an effect, sometimes they are reported as evidence that an effect is not present, and sometimes they are reported without an inference about the population effect. It is more important to determine the replicability of results that are reported as statistically significant support for a prediction. Z-scores greater than 4 were excluded because z-scores greater than 4 imply that this test had high statistical power (> 99%). Many of these results replicated successfully in the OSF-project. Thus, a simple rule is to assign a success rate of 100% to these findings. The Figure below shows the distribution of z-scores in the range form z = 0 to6, but the power estimate is applied to z-scores in the range between 2 and 4 (n = 66,212).

PHP-Curve Social Journals

The power estimate based on the post-hoc-power curve for z-scores between 2 and 4 is 46%. It is important to realize that this estimate is based on 70% of all significant results that were reported. As z-scores greater than 4 essentially have a power of 100%, the overall power estimate for all statistical tests that were reported is .46*.70 + .30 = .62. It is also important to keep in mind that this analysis uses all statistical tests that were reported including manipulation checks (e.g., pleasant picture were rated as more pleasant than unpleasant pictures). For this reason, the range of z-scores is limited to values between 2 and 4, which is much more likely to reflect a test of a focal hypothesis.

46% power for z-scores between 2 and 4 of is a higher estimate than the estimate for the 38 studies in the OSF-reproducibility project (35%). This suggests that the estimated replicability based on the OSF-results is an underestimation of the true replicability. The discrepancy between predicted and observed replicability in social psychology (8 vs. 38) and cognitive psychology (50 vs. 75), suggests that the rate of actual successful replications is about 20 to 30% lower than the success rate based on statistical prediction. Thus, the present analysis suggests that actual replication attempts of results in social psychology would produce significant results in about a quarter of all attempts (46% – 20% = 26%).

The large sample of test results makes it possible to make more detailed predictions for results with different strength of evidence. To provide estimates of replicability for different levels of evidence, I conducted post-hoc power analysis for intervals of half a standard deviation (z = .5). The power estimates are:

Strength of Evidence      Power    

2.0 to 2.5                            33%

2.5 to 3.0                            46%

3.0 to 3.5                            58%

3.5 to 4.0                            72%

IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING OF REPLICATION STUDIES

These estimates are important for researchers who are aiming to replicate a published study in social psychology. The reported effect sizes are inflated and a replication study with the same sample size has a low chance to produce a significant result even if a smaller effect exists.   To conducted a properly powered replication study, researchers would have to increase sample sizes. To illustrate, imagine that a study demonstrate a significant difference between two groups with 40 participants (20 in each cell) with a z-score of 2.3 (p = .02, two-tailed). The observed power for this result is 65% and it would suggest that a slightly larger sample of N = 60 is sufficient to achieve 80% power (80% chance to get a significant result). However, after correcting for bias, the true power is more likely to be just 33% (see table above) and power for a study with N = 60 would still only be 50%. To achieve 80% power, the replication study would need a sample size of 130 participants. Sample sizes would need to be even larger taking into account that the actual probability of a successful replication is even lower than the probability based on post-hoc power analysis. In the OSF-project only 1 out of 30 studies with an original z-score between 2 and 3 was successfully replicated.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EVALUATION OF PUBLISHED RESULTS

The results also have implications for the way social psychologists should conduct and evaluate new research. The main reason why z-scores between 2 and 3 provide untrustworthy evidence for an effect is that they are obtained with underpowered studies and publication bias. As a result, it is likely that the strength of evidence is inflated. If, however, the same z-scores were obtained in studies with high power, a z-score of 2.5 would provide more credible evidence for an effect. The strength of evidence in a single study would still be subject to random sampling error, but it would no longer be subject to systematic bias. Therefore, the evidence would be more likely to reveal a true effect and it would be less like to be a false positive.   This implies that z-scores should be interpreted in the context of other information about the likelihood of selection bias. For example, a z-score of 2.5 in a pre-registered study provides stronger evidence for an effect than the same z-score in a study where researchers may have had a chance to conduct multiple studies and to select the most favorable results for publication.

The same logic can also be applied to journals and labs. A z-score of 2.5 in a journal with an average z-score of 2.3 is less trustworthy than a z-score of 2.5 in a journal with an average z-score of 3.5. In the former journal, a z-score of 2.5 is likely to be inflated, whereas in the latter journal a z-score of 2.5 is more likely to be negatively biased by sampling error. For example, currently a z-score of 2.5 is more likely to reveal a true effect if it is published in a cognitive journal than a social journal (see ranking of psychology journals).

The same logic applies even more strongly to labs because labs have a distinct research culture (MO). Some labs conduct many underpowered studies and publish only the studies that worked. Other labs may conduct fewer studies with high power. A z-score of 2.5 is more trustworthy if it comes from a lab with high average power than from a lab with low average power. Thus, providing information about the post-hoc-power of individual researchers can help readers to evaluate the strength of evidence of individual studies in the context of the typical strength of evidence that is obtained in a specific lab. This will create an incentive to publish results with strong evidence rather than fishing for significant results because a low replicability index increases the criterion at which results from a lab provide evidence for an effect.

The Replicability of Cognitive Psychology in the OSF-Reproducibility-Project

The OSF-Reproducibility Project (Psychology) aimed to replicate 100 results published in original research articles in three psychology journals in 2008. The selected journals focus on publishing results from experimental psychology. The main paradigm of experimental psychology is to recruit samples of participants and to study their behaviors in controlled laboratory conditions. The results are then generalized to the typical behavior of the average person.

An important methodological distinction in experimental psychology is the research design. In a within-subject design, participants are exposed to several (a minimum of two) situations and the question of interest is whether responses to one situation differ from behavior in other situations. The advantage of this design is that individuals serve as their own controls and variation due to unobserved causes (mood, personality, etc.) does not influence the results. This design can produce high statistical power to study even small effects. The design is often used by cognitive psychologists because the actual behaviors are often simple behaviors (e.g., pressing a button) that can be repeated many times (e.g., to demonstrate interference in the Stroop paradigm).

In a between-subject design, participants are randomly assigned to different conditions. A mean difference between conditions reveals that the experimental manipulation influenced behavior. The advantage of this design is that behavior is not influenced by previous behaviors in the experiment (carry over effects). The disadvantage is that many uncontrolled factors (e..g, mood, personality) also influence behavior. As a result, it can be difficult to detect small effects of an experimental manipulation among all of the other variance that is caused by uncontrolled factors. As a result, between-subject designs require large samples to study small effects or they can only be used to study large effects.

One of the main findings of the OSF-Reproducibility Project was that results from within-subject designs used by cognitive psychology were more likely to replicate than results from between-subject designs used by social psychologists. There were two few between-subject studies by cognitive psychologists or within-subject designs by social psychologists to separate these factors.   This result of the OSF-reproducibility project was predicted by PHP-curves of the actual articles as well as PHP-curves of cognitive and social journals (Replicability-Rankings).

Given the reliable difference between disciplines within psychology, it seems problematic to generalize the results of the OSF-reproducibility project across all areas of psychology. For this reason, I conducted separate analyses for social psychology and for cognitive psychology. This post examines the replicability of results in cognitive psychology. The results for social psychology are posted here.

The master data file of the OSF-reproducibilty project contained 167 studies with replication results for 99 studies. 42 replications were classified as cognitive studies. I excluded Reynolds and Bresner was excluded because the original finding was not significant. I excluded C Janiszewski, D Uy (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02057.x) because it examined the anchor effect, which I consider to be social psychology. Finally, I excluded two studies with children as participants because this research falls into developmental psychology (E Nurmsoo, P Bloom; V Lobue, JS DeLoache).

I first conducted a post-hoc-power analysis of the reported original results. Test statistics were first converted into two-tailed p-values and two-tailed p-values were converted into absolute z-scores using the formula (1 – norm.inverse(1-p/2). Post-hoc power was estimated by fitting the observed z-scores to predicted z-scores with a mixed-power model with three parameters (Brunner & Schimmack, in preparation).

Estimated power was 75%. This finding reveals the typical presence of publication bias because the actual success rate of 100% is too high given the power of the studies.  Based on this estimate, one would expect that only 75% of the 38 findings (k = 29) would produce a significant result in a set of 38 exact replication studies with the same design and sample size.

PHP-Curve OSF-REP Cognitive Original Data

The Figure visualizes the discrepancy between observed z-scores and the success rate in the original studies. Evidently, the distribution is truncated and suggests a file-drawer of missing studies with non-significant results. However, the mode of the curve (it’s highest point) is projected to be on the right side of the significance criterion (z = 1.96, p = .05 (two-tailed)), which suggests that more than 50% of results should replicate. Given the absence of reliable data in the range from 0 to 1.96, the data make it impossible to estimate the exact distribution in this region, but the gentle decline of z-scores on the right side of the significance criterion suggests that the file-drawer is relatively small.

Sample sizes of the replication studies were based on power analysis with the reported effect sizes. The problem with this approach is that the reported effect sizes are inflated and provide an inflated estimate of true power. With a true power estimate of 75%, the inflated power estimates were above 80% and often over 90%. As a result, many replication studies used the same sample size and some even used a smaller sample size because the original study appeared to be overpowered (the sample size was much larger than needed). The median sample size for the original studies was 32. The median sample size for the replication studies was N = 32. Changes in sample sizes make it difficult to compare the replication rate of the original studies with those of the replication study. Therefore, I adjusted the z-scores of the replication study to match z-scores that would have been obtained with the original sample size. Based on the post-hoc-power analysis above, I predicted that 75% of the replication studies would produce a significant result (k = 29). I also had posted predictions for individual studies based on a more comprehensive assessment of each article. The success rate for my a priori predictions was 69% (k = 27).

The actual replication rate based on adjusted z-scores was 63% (k = 22), although 3 studies produced only p-values between .05 and .06 after the adjustment was applied. If these studies were not counted, the success rate would have been 50% (19/38). This finding suggests that post-hoc power analysis overestimates true power by 10% to 25%. However, it is also possible that some of the replication studies failed to reproduce the exact experimental conditions of the original studies, which would lower the probability of obtaining a significant result. Moreover, the number of studies is very small and the discrepancy may simply be due to random sampling error. The important result is that post-hoc power curves correctly predict that the success rate in a replication study will be lower than the actual success rate because it corrects for the effect of publication bias. It also correctly predicts that a substantial number of studies will be successfully replicated, which they were. In comparison, post-hoc power analysis of social psychology predicted only 35% of successful replications and only 8% successfully replicated. Thus, post-hoc power analysis correctly predicts that results in cognitive psychology are more replicable than results in social psychology.

The next figure shows the post-hoc-power curve for the sample-size corrected z-scores of the replication studies.

PHP-Curve OSF-REP Cognitive Adj. Rep. Data

The PHP-Curve estimate of power for z-scores in the range from 0 to 4 is 53% for the heterogeneous model that fits the data better than a homogeneous model. The shape of the distribution suggests that several of the non-significant results are type-II errors; that is, the studies had insufficient statistical power to demonstrate a real effect.

I also conducted a power analysis that was limited to the non-significant results. The estimated average power was 22%. This power is a mixture of true power in different studies and may contain some cases of true false positives (power = .05), but the existing data are insufficient to determine whether results are true false positives or whether a small effect is present and sample sizes were too small to detect it. Again, it is noteworthy that the same analysis for social psychology produced an estimate of 5%, which suggests that most of the non-significant results in social psychology are true false positives (the null-effect is true).

Below I discuss my predictions of individual studies.

Eight studies reported an effect with a z-score greater than 4 (4 sigma), and I predicted that all of the 4-sigma effects would replicate. 7 out of 8 effects were successfully replicated (D Ganor-Stern, J Tzelgov; JI Campbell, ND Robert; M Bassok, SF Pedigo, AT Oskarsson; PA White; E Vul, H Pashler; E Vul, M Nieuwenstein, N Kanwisher; J Winawer, AC Huk, L Boroditsky). The only exception was CP Beaman, I Neath, AM Surprenant (DOI: 10.1037/0278-7393.34.1.219). It is noteworthy that the sample size of the original study was N = 99 and the sample size of the replication study was N = 14. Even with an adjusted z-score the study produced a non-significant result (p = .19). However, small samples produce less reliable results and it would be interesting to examine whether the result would become significant with an actual sample of 99 participants.

Based on more detailed analysis of individual articles, I predicted that an additional 19 studies would replicate. However, 9 out these 19 studies were not successfully replicated. Thus, my predictions of additional successful replications are just at chance level, given the overall success rate of 50%.

Based on more detailed analysis of individual articles, I predicted that 11 studies would not replicate. However, 5 out these 11 studies were successfully replicated. Thus, my predictions of failed replications are just at chance level, given the overall success rate of 50%.

In short, my only rule that successfully predicted replicability of individual studies was the 4-sigma rule that predicts that all findings with a z-score greater than 4 will replicate.

In conclusion, a replicability of 50-60% is consistent with Cohen’s (1962) suggestion that typical studies in psychology have 60% power. Post-hoc power analysis slightly overestimated the replicability of published findings despite its ability to correct for publication bias. Future research needs to examine the sources that lead to a discrepancy between predicted and realized success rate. It is possible that some of this discrepancy is due to moderating factors. Although a replicability of 50-60% is not as catastrophic as the results for social psychology with estimates in the range from 8-35%, cognitive psychologists should aim to increase the replicability of published results. Given the widespread use of powerful within-subject designs, this is easily achieved by a modest increase in sample sizes from currently 30 participants to 50 participants, which would increase power from 60% to 80%.